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Abstract 
 
 
The great development of newer technologies also carries an important growth in the 
number of malicious attacks [1]. Even private networks without external Internet 
connections suffer from those attacks. These private networks play a crucial role in the 
country’s security. Imagine the consequences of turning the power of an entire city 
down or a denial of service [2] in an air traffic control system. Because of this fact, 
numerous politicians, including the recently named United States of America’s 
president, Donald Trump, are seriously taking into consideration the huge importance of 
protecting the private networks from intrusions in order to assure their countries’ peace. 
Some people even believe that efficient Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [3] could be 
a good protection against a possible Third World War. Thus, new and more powerful 
security solutions need to be developed to protect our organizations’ systems.  
 
 
Key words: Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Data Distribution Service (DDS), Real-
Time Publish-Subscribe Protocol (RTPS), private networks, intrusions, constraint 
engine, network constraints, trees.  
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Resumen 
 
 
El gran desarrollo de las nuevas tecnologías conlleva también un aumento considerable 
en el número de ataques maliciosos [1]. Incluso las redes privadas sin conexión externa 
a Internet sufren estos ataques. Estas redes privadas juegan un papel crucial en la 
seguridad de cada país. Imagínense las consecuencias de tirar abajo la corriente eléctrica 
de una ciudad entera o una denegación de servicio [2] en un sistema de control aéreo. 
Debido a este hecho, numerosos políticos, incluido el recientemente nombrado 
presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, Donald Trump, están concienciándose 
seriamente de la enorme importancia que supone proteger las redes privadas frente a 
intrusiones para asegurar la paz en sus países. Alguna gente cree incluso que unos 
Sistemas de Detección de Intrusiones (IDS) [3] efectivos pueden ser una buena medida 
de protección ante una posible Tercera Guerra Mundial. De esta forma, nuevas y más 
potentes medidas de seguridad tienen que desarrollarse para proteger los sistemas de 
nuestras organizaciones. 
 
 
Palabras clave: Sistema de Detección de Intrusiones (IDS),  Servicio de Distribución 
de Datos (DDS), Protocolo de Publicación-Subscripción en Tiempo Real (RTPS), redes 
privadas, intrusiones, motor de restricciones, restricciones de red, árboles.  
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Glossary 
 
• ABS: Anomaly-Based System 
• ATC: Air Traffic Control 
• DAG: Directed Acyclic Graph 
• DDS: Data Distribution Service 
• DoS: Denial of Service 
• DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service 
• DPI: Deep Packet Inspection 
• IDS: Intrusion Detection System 
• IGMP: Internet Group Management Protocol  
• NIDS: Network Intrusion Detection System 
• OMG: Object Management Group 
• PCAP: Packet capture 
• QoS: Quality of Service  
• RTPS: Real Time Publish-Subscribe Protocol 
• SBS: Signature-Based System 
• SCL: Syntax Constraint Language 
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Glosario 
 
• ABS: Sistema Basado en Anomalías 
• ATC: Control de Tráfico Aéreo 
• DAG: Gráfico Acíclico Dirigido 
• DDS: Servicio de Distribución de Datos 
• DoS: Denegación de Servicio 
• DDoS: Denegación de Servicio Distribuida 
• DPI: Inspección Profunda de Paquetes 
• IDS: Sistema de Detección de Intrusiones 
• IGMP: Protocolo de Gestión de Grupos en Internet 
• NIDS: Sistema de Detección de Intrusiones en Redes 
• OMG: Grupo de Gestión de Objetos 
• PCAP: Captura de Paquetes 
• QoS: Calidad del Servicio 
• RTPS: Protocolo de Publicación-Subscripción en Tiempo Real 
• SBS: Sistema Basado en Firmas 
• SCL: Lenguaje de Sintaxis de Restricciones 
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1. Introduction 
 
First and vital step to secure a private network is to constantly monitor the ongoing 
traffic and define a network’s “normal behavior”. This behavior could be characterized 
by a set of network constraints [4], so a violation of these constraints indicates a 
possible intrusion. It is also crucial to detect these intruders as soon as possible to 
minimize their damage to the network. But in large organizations, in which thousands of 
packets are transmitted every second to the network, this task might not be easy. 
 
 
1.1. Objective 
 
The goal of this research project is to present a novel framework to protect private 
networks with a limited number of protocols against intrusion attacks, by detecting 
those packets that differ from the normal behavior in real time [5]. For that, we will 
model the normal traffic patterns as network constraints and present how the 
framework is evaluating these constraints against traffic from an experimental 
network using PCAP tools [6]. Figure 1 represents a big picture of the global 
project’s behavior. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Global Project Architecture. 
 
 
Concretely, I will be working on the Constraint Engine and my objective will be to     
design, implement and correctly test the performance of three constraints against 
sample traffic from our experimental network. 
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1.2. Method 
 
We are firstly exploring the mentioned framework using two protocols: Internet 
Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [7] and Real Time Publish and Subscribe 
Protocol (RTPS) [8], being this last one based in the Data Distribution Service 
(DDS) mechanism [9]. DDS provides effective support and security for critical 
services, such as air traffic control management or financial trading. Hence, we start 
focusing our research on these protocols because they might be used by the kind of 
applications for what we are aiming our approach. But, once our program is 
properly working with these two protocols, our final goal is to build a software able 
to work among any protocol defined, allowing it to, once given the protocol’s 
definition using a specific language that we create, automatically develop and 
evaluate the set of constraints for that concrete protocol. 
 
Focusing on my particular job, for every defined constraint I will draw a tree that 
corresponds to its specification to, later on, handily define and create a skeleton for 
that tree structure in C. Additionally, I will implement all its respective functions to 
properly work within the system. 
 
 
1.3. Document Structure 
 
First of all, I will go through all the previous background concepts that need to be 
taken into consideration in order to later better understand the project itself. Here I 
will talk about concepts such as private networks, deep packet inspection and 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems, as well as some protocols that will be used. 
Besides, in this section I will briefly describe our global project framework. 
Secondly, I will mention the network constraints that we have come up with so far, 
including a deeper explanation of the constraints I have personally been working on. 
The third section of the report contains the information related to the trees’ 
structures I have developed to build the constraints and everything related to the 
implementation of the constraints I have mentioned before. Thus, for each of those 
constraints, I will explain the four-phase mechanism that is followed from the 
creation to the deletion of their corresponding trees. 
In the fourth section it is described how the constraints are evaluated with my trees 
structures’ approach, differentiating it from my partner’s approach. 
Finally, the Conclusions and Future Work section includes the results of the 
evaluation of the constraints I have worked on using my approach, as well as some 
related work that could be done in the future.  
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2. Introducción 
 
El primer y vital paso para asegurar las redes privadas consiste en monitorizar 
constantemente el tráfico en marcha y definir un “comportamiento normal” de la red. 
Este comportamiento podría caracterizarse por una serie de restricciones de red [4], por 
lo que una violación de estas restricciones indicaría una posible intrusión. También, 
resulta crucial detectar estos intrusos tan pronto como sea posible para minimizar el 
daño que puedan causar a la red. Sin embargo, en grandes organizaciones en las que se 
mandan a la red miles de paquetes por segundo, esta tarea puede no resultar fácil. 
 
 
2.1. Objetivos 
 
El propósito de este proyecto de investigación consiste en presentar un novedoso 
entorno para proteger redes privadas con un número de protocolos limitado ante 
ataques de intrusiones, a través de la detección de aquellos paquetes que difieran del 
comportamiento normal en tiempo real [5]. Para ello, modelaremos patrones que 
representen el tráfico normal en la red como restricciones y presentaremos cómo el 
entorno está evaluando dichas restricciones ante tráfico obtenido de una red 
experimental usando herramientas PCAP [6]. La Figura 1 representa a gran escala el 
comportamiento global del proyecto. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Arquitectura Global del Proyecto. 
 
 
Concretamente, yo estaré trabajando en el Motor de Restricciones y mi objetivo 
consistirá en el diseño, implementación y correcta prueba del rendimiento de tres 
restricciones ante el tráfico de prueba de nuestra red experimental. 
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2.2. Método 
 
En primer lugar, estamos explorando el entorno mencionado usando dos protocolos: 
el Protocolo de Gestión de Grupos en Internet (IGMP) [7] y el Protocolo de 
Publicación-Subscripción en Tiempo Real (RTPS) [8], estando este último basado 
en el mecanismo del Servicio de Distribución de Datos (DDS) [9]. DDS proporciona 
un apoyo eficaz y seguridad para tipos de servicios críticos, como pueden ser la 
gestión de control de tráfico aéreo o el comercio financiero. De ahí que empecemos 
a centrar nuestra investigación en estos protocolos, ya que podrían ser usados por el 
tipo de aplicaciones para los que estamos fijando nuestro objetivo. Pero una vez que 
nuestro programa funcione correctamente para estos dos protocolos, nuestro 
objetivo final consistirá en construir un software capaz de trabajar con cualquier 
protocolo que se le defina, permitiéndole, una vez especificada la definición de tal 
protocolo usando un lenguaje que nosotros mismos crearemos, desarrollar y evaluar 
automáticamente el conjunto de restricciones para dicho protocolo en concreto. 
 
Centrándonos en mi trabajo en particular, para cada una de las restricciones 
definidas, dibujaré el árbol que corresponda a su especificación para, más tarde 
definir y crear a mano un esqueleto para esa estructura de árbol en C. 
Adicionalmente, implementaré todas sus respectivas funciones para que puedan 
integrarse y funcionar correctamente dentro de nuestro sistema. 
 
 
2.3. Estructura del documento 
 
Primero, explicaré brevemente todos los conceptos previos que necesitan ser 
comprendidos para más tarde entender mejor el proyecto en sí. Aquí, trataré 
conceptos tales como redes privadas, inspección profunda de paquetes y Sistemas de 
Detección de Intrusiones en Redes, así como algunos protocolos que serán usados. 
Además, en esta sección describiré por encima el entorno global de nuestro 
proyecto. 
En segundo lugar, mencionaré las restricciones de red que hemos encontrado hasta 
el momento, incluyendo una mayor explicación de las restricciones sobre las que yo 
he estado trabajando personalmente. 
La tercera sección de la memoria contiene toda la información relacionada con las 
estructuras de árboles que he desarrollado para construir las restricciones, y todo 
lo relacionado con la implementación de dichas restricciones que he mencionado 
anteriormente. Así, para cada una de esas restricciones, explicaré el mecanismo de 
cuatro-fases que es seguido por ellas desde la creación hasta la eliminación de sus 
árboles correspondientes. 
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En la cuarta sección se describe cómo las restricciones son evaluadas con ese 
enfoque de las estructuras de árboles, diferenciándolo del enfoque que daba mi 
compañero para su evaluación. 
Finalmente, la sección de Conclusiones y Trabajo Futuro incluye los resultados de 
la evaluación de las restricciones sobre las que he trabajado usando mi enfoque, así 
como trabajo relacionado con el tema que puede ser desarrollado en el futuro.  
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3. Background 
 
Handful open source IDS [10], such as Snort, Suricata or Bro [11], are currently 
available but, in spite of providing fantastic features and incredibly large rule sets, they 
all have a common flaw: they only support a few famous protocols, like HTTP [12] or 
TCP [13], and it results a truly tough task to add new rules to the data set. Due to the 
fact that most of the private networks use their own protocols built for specific 
purposes, these Intrusion Detection Systems fail to be effective. That is why we focus 
our approach on developing an IDS able to cope and produce satisfactory results with 
any protocol.  
 
 
3.1. Global Project Framework 
 
Our previously research group’s proposed framework is divided into three modules: 
Scanning, Parsing and Constraint Engine [5]. Figure 2 shows a simplified idea of the 
interaction between those three modules. Basically, the data flow consists of reading 
and parsing the packets, and converting them into data structures able to be used by 
the Constraint Checker.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Modules of Intrusion Detection Framework. 
 
 
The scanning module is in charge of reading the packets from PCAP files using 
Wireshark [14] and extracting the essential data. Currently, two IP protocols are 
supported: IGMP and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [15]. For every single packet, 
the Scanner passes the following information to the Parser: source IP, destination IP 
and arrival time. Besides, it will pass the source and destination ports if there is a 
UDP packet. 
 
The Parsing module receives these packets along with their information, parses 
them and converts them into C data structures. An alert is generated if the Parser 
fails to parse any packet. Some examples of failures could be malformed data, like 
non-sensitive date or time values, or errors in lengths, such as attempted buffer 
overflows [16]. On the contrary, if the packets are successfully parsed, they are 
passed along to the Constraint Engine, where I am going to focus my work. 
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The Constraint Checker is an engine that implements a several number of 
constraints related to the definition of the protocols. Currently, it is being hand-
written by the research group, but it is designed as a template to be later 
automatically generated from a specific language specification which we are 
working on. My mission in the Constraint Engine is to develop an approach to 
define the network constraints as tree structures [17] and, later on, integrate my code 
with the Parser module and evaluate those trees against sample RTPS data generated 
by our experimental network. Concretely, I should be able to test my approach for 
three constraints. 
 
Our initial Parser, inherited from previous penetration testing research [18], used a 
general engine that is parameterized by a grammar graph. This graph is generated 
from a Syntax Constraint Language (SCL) protocol description [19]. SCL derives 
from ASN.1 [20], which contains XML markup [21] to provide both context 
sensitive parsing and general constraints. Our grammars for IGMP and RTPS were 
validated against multiple sources of network data to ensure that the grammar was 
correct. However, the Parser turned out to be too slow for our intrusion detection 
prototype when evaluated against packet data from an industrial partner. 
Consequently, we decided to develop a new Parser, which is a hand written, 
designed with the intention of being automatically generated in the future. Thus, we 
have manually followed a rigorous approach to translate the SCL to produce a hand 
coded parser. 
 
 
3.2. Private Networks 
 
In networks such as our home Internet or a cafe’s Wi-Fi we can download apps, 
send emails, play games, use Facebook or watch YouTube videos. To sum up, there 
isn’t any restriction about the protocols used or the type of packets sent through the 
network. Not even about the type or number of devices connected to it. 
Consequently, it results a really tough work to monitor the ongoing traffic or 
determine what is “normal” in those networks. These are called public or 
conventional networks. 
 
On the other hand, private networks or intranets are networks created by a single 
organization that controls its security policies and network management. This means 
that the devices connected to them are clearly identified, and that the packets that 
they send belong to a certain type of allowed packets. They use a limited number of 
protocols. Examples of these networks are telecommunication, nuclear and power 
plants, or aircraft control systems, which represent critical infrastructures. 
 
Private networks increase their security by preventing external access, protecting 
their industrial control operation from outside attacks. However, a private network is 
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not fully secured, as malware could be injected by USB drives or installation discs. 
For instance, the worldwide known case of the Stuxnet worm used to attack a 
nuclear plant in Natanz was distributed by an USB flash drive [22]. As a result, even 
more protection needs to be developed. Perimeter checking, such as firewalls and 
authentication policies [23], are useful defensive techniques, but they can’t monitor 
the ongoing traffic. The only way of performing that duty is using an Intrusion 
Detection System [24]. 
 
 
3.3. Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are the most efficient way of 
defending against network-based attacks. They consist in a device or software 
application that monitors a network for malicious activity or policy violations. NIDS 
are placed at strategic point or points of the organization and performs an analysis of 
passing traffic on the entire subnet. These systems are widely used among large-
scale IT infrastructures [25]. Basically, there are two main types of NIDS: signature-
based (SBS) and anomaly-based (ABS). 
 
On the one hand, signature-based IDS refers to the detection of attacks by looking 
for specific patterns, such as byte sequences in network traffic, or known malicious 
instruction sequences used by malware. They maintain a database of signatures of 
previously known attacks and compare them with the analyzed data. Thus, an alarm 
would be raised when the signatures were matched. The main advantage of this 
technique is that signatures are very easy to develop and understand if we know 
what network behavior we are trying to identify. Moreover, pattern matching can be 
done more efficiently as they can perform this matching with just a small rule set. 
For instance, if the system that is to be protected only communicates via DNS [26] 
and ICMP [27], all other signatures can be ignored. However, SBS only detect 
attacks whose signatures are previously stored in the database, so zero-day attacks 
[28] cannot be detected. 
 
On the other hand, anomaly-based IDS were primarily created to detect unknown 
attacks, due to the fast development of malware [29]. In contrast to SBS, they build 
a statistical model describing the normal network traffic and, and any abnormal 
behavior that deviates from the model is identified. As anomaly based detection is 
based on defining the network behavior, it requires a training phase to develop the 
database of general attacks and a careful setting of threshold level of detection. This 
accepted network behavior is prepared or learned by the specifications of the 
network administrators. The major drawback of ABS is defining its rule set.  As a 
consequence, the efficiency of the system depends on how well it is implemented 
and tested on all protocols. Hence, we introduce the concept of constraints in our 
system because it represents more concise actions than rules [30]. Furthermore, even 
using dynamic rules of existing IDS, it results a really tough task to create a flexible 
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and expressive rule set which can represent a real complex attack scenario [5]. The 
major advantage over SBS is that a novel attack for which a signature does not exist 
can be detected if it falls out of the normal traffic patterns. 
 
 
3.4. Deep Packet Inspection 
 
There is a large number of organizations protecting their networks with firewalls, 
simply limiting their traffic through the ports 22, 80 and 443, corresponding with the 
SSH [31], HTTP [9] and HTTPS [32] protocols respectively. Any packet 
transmitted by a protocol which does not correspond to any of these three ones, is 
automatically discarded. However, attackers have found the way of intruding those 
networks hiding their functionality under either the SSH, HTTP or HTTPS protocols 
[33]. As a result, they are able to snick into the network’s allowed traffic without 
being noticed and correspondingly rejected by the firewalls.  
 
Because of these attackers, a simply firewall is not enough to protect the networks, 
and more sophisticated techniques need to be developed. Here come to scene the 
term ‘Deep Packet Inspection’. DPI is an advanced method of packet filtering that 
functions at the Application layer of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) 
reference model [34]. “The use of DPI makes it possible to find, identify, classify, 
reroute or block packets with specific data or code payloads that conventional 
packet filtering, such as firewalls, which examines only packet headers, cannot 
detect” [35]. By looking deeply into the packet fields, it is possible to identify the 
real data that is being sent in each packet. This makes it effective against buffer 
overflow attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks and certain types of malware. 
 
 
3.5. Data Distribution Service 
 
The Data Distribution Service (DDS) is an Object Management Group (OMG) 
protocol whose goal is to provide reliable real-time and scalable communications at 
a high performance by using a publish-subscribe mechanism. Air traffic control, 
financial trading or other big data applications are examples of environments where 
a protocol like DDS is needed for their purposes. Besides, this standard is widely 
used among worldwide recognized institutions such as the NASA [36] or the 
Canadian Air Traffic Control System [37], as well as in the mining industry to check 
mining equipment and in the automobile sector to develop simulators [38]. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, DDS provides an infrastructure layer that enables many 
different types of applications to communicate with each other. 
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Fig. 3. DDS Infrastructure. 
 
 
Pardo-Castellote’s paper says: “Publish-subscribe applications are typically 
distributed applications with endpoint nodes that communicate with each other by 
sending (or publishing) data and receiving (or subscribing) data anonymously. 
Usually the only property that a publisher needs in order to communicate with a 
subscriber is the topic name and the definition of the data. What is more, the 
publisher does not need any information about the subscribers and vice versa”. 
Resultantly, the only needed thing to listen to certain data is the Topic Key of the 
data published and the Domain Id.  
 
As said in the RTI paper, “A publish-subscribe infrastructure is capable of 
delivering data to the appropriate nodes without having to set up individual 
connections between them”. Machines interested in receiving packets related to a 
certain topic just need to become a subscriber for that topic. Analogously, nodes 
willing to send data about a certain topic just need to become a publisher of that 
topic, and the DDS infrastructure will automatically assure that the published 
information is distributed to all subscribers interested in that topic, without the 
publisher needing to specify those destination ports. 
 
The specification for DDS is broken up into two separate layers: Data-Centric 
Publish-Subscribe (DCPS) and Data Local Reconstruction Layer (DLRL) [13]. For 
our purpose, we will only concentrate on the DCPS portion of the specification.  
RTI’s paper defines DCPS as following: “DCPS is the lower layer API that an 
application can use to communicate with other DDS-enabled applications”. This 
communication mechanism provides them the ability to specify several Quality of 
Service (QoS) parameters, such as rate of publication, rate of subscription or how 
long data is valid for. These parameters allow the system designers to build a 
customized distributed application based on their requirements. In DCPS, 
applications must use APIs to create entities (objects) in order to establish publish-
subscribe communications between each other. DCPS has the following primary 
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entities: Domain, Domain Participant, Data Writer, Publisher, Data Reader, 
Subscriber and Topic. Figure 4 shows how entities in DDS are related. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. DDS Entities. 
 
 
The Domain is the basic element needed to bind individual applications and start a 
communication between them. DDS has the capability of supporting both a single 
Domain of application’s data-centric [13] communications, and multiple Domains. 
If the system is using a single Domain, all the nodes will communicate within this 
Domain. On the contrary, if we have a system that can scale with effective data 
isolation, we might choose multiple Domains. Therefore, when specific data is 
published in one Domain, it will not be received by Subscribers residing on any 
other Domains. Moreover, multiple Domains are also a great way to control the 
introduction of a new functionality into an existing system. 
 
An application uses a Domain Participant to represent its activity within a Domain. 
This allows developers to define default QoS parameters for all Data Writers, 
Publishers, Data Readers and Subscribers in that Domain. Thus, this makes it easy 
to specify default behavior in the Domain. 
 
Obtained from Pardo-Castellote’s paper, “Data Writers are the primary access point 
for an application to publish data into a DDS domain”. An application uses Data 
Writers to send data. These are associated with a single Topic. An application can 
have multiple Data Writers and Topics. Besides, it can have more than one Data 
Writer for a particular Topic. However, before being able to perform a write call, 
Data Writers need to be created and configured with the correct QoS settings. 
 
The Publisher is just a container to group and manage together individual Data 
Writers. It represents the DCPS object responsible for the actual sending of data.  
Whereas a Data Writer can only be owned by a single Publisher a Publisher can own 
multiple Data Writers [39]. Hence, the same Publisher may be sending data for 
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several different Topics of different data types. “When user code calls 
the write() method on a Data Writer, the DDS data sample is passed to 
the Publisher object which does the actual dissemination of data on the network” 
[39]. A developer can specify the QoS behavior for a Publisher and have it applied 
to all the Data Writers in that Publisher’s group. Figure 5 illustrates how these 
entities are connected to establish the communication. 
 
Defined in the RTI paper, “A Data Reader is the primary access point for an 
application to access data that has been received by a Subscriber”. Also, a Data 
Reader is associated with a single Topic and, once again, an application can have 
multiple Data Readers and Topics [39]. Additionally, it can have more than one 
Data Reader for a single Topic. Data can be accessed by the take() or read() 
methods. The take() call removes the data from the middleware after returning it, 
while the read() call allows the same data to be retrieved several times. Once created 
and configured with the correct QoS, an application can be notified that data is 
available in one of three ways: 
 
1. Listener Callback Routine: consists in setting up a listener callback routine that 
DDS will run immediately when data is received. 
2. Polling the Data Reader: consists in “polling” or querying the Data Reader to 
determine if data is available. 
3. Conditions and WaitSets: the application waits until a specified condition is 
matched and then it accesses the data from the Data Reader. 
 
Just as Publishers are used to group together multiple Data Writers, Subscribers are 
used to group together several Data Readers. Subscribers own and manage Data 
Readers. Again, although a Data Reader can exclusively be owned by a single 
Subscriber, a Subscriber can own many Data Readers. Thus, the 
same Subscriber may receive data for many different Topics of different data types. 
When data is sent to an application, it is first processed by a Subscriber; the DDS 
data sample is then stored in the appropriate Data Reader. Analogously to how 
Publishers work, this allows you to configure a default set of QoS parameters that 
will apply to all the Data Readers in that Subscriber’s group. 
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Fig. 5. DDS Objects Communication Overview. 
 
Topics represent the basic connection point between Publishers and Subscribers. To 
establish the communication, the Topic of a given Publisher on one node must 
match the Topic of an associated Subscriber on any other node. A Topic is 
comprised of a Topic Name, which uniquely identifies the Topic within a Domain, 
and a Topic Type, which has the definition of the data contained within the Topic. 
Topics must be uniquely defined for a particular Domain. Even if two Topic Types 
were exactly the same defined, they would be considered two different Topics 
within the DDS infrastructure if the Topic Names do not match. 
 
Taken from the RTI’s DDS paper, “Within the definition of the Topic Type, one or 
more data elements of it can be chosen to be a Key”. The DDS middleware will use 
this Key to match the data. Thus, by specifying a Key, an application can then 
retrieve data from DDS that either matches a specific Key, or the next Key of a 
sequence of Keys. In conclusion, Keys provide scalability [13]. 
 
DDS provides developers with the QoS capability to specify different parameters for 
each individual Topic, Writer or Reader. This constitutes the essence of data 
centricity in DDS. Thanks to these QoS parameters, developers can widely design 
their system. Some examples of these parameters are: Deadline, Durability, Latency 
Budget, Liveliness, Ownership, Partition, etc [13]. 
 
 
3.6. Real-Time Publish-Subscribe Protocol 
 
The Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) protocol started to be used in industrial 
automation and was specifically developed to support the unique requirements of 
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data-distribution systems [40]. The industrial automation community defined 
requirements for a standard publish-subscribe protocol were very similar to the ones 
defined for the DDS targeted application domains. The OMG commented in 2008: 
“As a direct result, a close synergy exists between DDS and the RTPS wire-
protocol, both in terms of the underlying behavioral architecture and the features of 
RTPS.” 
 
The RTPS protocol was designed to be able to run over connectionless transmission 
models, such as UDP. As described in the OMG paper, “In fact, it is sufficient that 
the transport offers a connectionless service capable of sending packets best-effort. 
That is, the transport need not guarantee each packet will reach its destination or that 
packets are delivered in-order. Where required, RTPS implements reliability in the 
transfer of data and state above the transport interface.” To sum up, this does not 
exclude RTPS from being implemented on top of reliable transports, but it just 
allows the protocol to be used in a wider range of transports. Therefore, its main 
features make RTPS an excellent match for a DDS wire-protocol [12]. 
 
 
3.7. Internet Group Management Protocol 
 
The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) is a communications protocol 
that runs on top of IP used by hosts and routers on IPv4 networks to create multicast 
group memberships, where messages can be send to all the members of that group at 
a single time. It can be used for one-to-many networking applications such as 
gaming or online video streaming [41]. Currently, there are three versions of the 
protocol [11]. 
 
IGMP provides communication between the client computer and the router on the 
network layer, just like other network management protocols such as ICMP. A 
client (host) requests membership to a group through its local router to become part 
of the communication, whereas a router just listens to these requests and 
periodically sends out subscription queries. In our approach, we are concerned about 
IGMP’s basic operation and common messages sent between the hosts and router. 
The following messages could correspond to the normal IGMP’s behavior: 
 
• General Query: sent periodically from to router to the IP address 224.0.0.1 
(all hosts group) to check if there is any host that wants to join a certain 
group and receive their own particular multicast traffic, or simply check if 
the hosts of that group are still alive and willing to continue listening. An 
interval can be set for periodically query the hosts to join a group. 
 
• Group-specific Query: similar to a General Query, but just targeting a 
particular group instead of all the groups of the attached network. 
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• Membership Report: once the router sends a General or Group-specific 
Query, those hosts interested in listening to the multicast group’s traffic or 
new hosts willing to join the group send back their membership reports to the 
router. If a host does not reply to the router’s query means that is no longer 
interested in that group’s messages. Besides, it is possible that a host sends 
its Membership Report to a router without previously receiving a query [42]. 
 
• Leave Report: when a host wants to leave a group, it will send a “leave 
message” to its specific group address. If the host sends a general leave 
group message to the all-router multicast group (224.0.0.2), that means that 
all the host in the subnet want to leave the group. Therefore, if after that the 
router sends two group-specific queries to ensure the absence of all members 
in the group, there would be no response. 
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4. Network Constraints 
 
Network constraints are what define the normal behavior of the network. Although 
some constraints that define the structure of each packet are handled by the parser, 
constraints involving multiple packets are handled by the constraint engine. Usually, 
IDS use rules or events to represent the normal flow pattern of the network traffic. 
However, as I mentioned before, we decided to introduce the concept of constraints in a 
network because we believe that they represent more concise actions than rules. 
Thereby, we consider network constraints one of the key factors of an IDS and what 
makes our research approach different from previous IDS research. 
 
As a primary version of our approach, we have developed a set of 11 constraints [5] 
based in the RTPS and IGMP protocols’ documentation, sample network traffic and 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on DDS. Although most of the 
existing IDS are capable of handling this type of attacks, they require creating highly 
complicated and inflexible rules. Because of that reason, we propose much easier-to-
understand and more-flexible-to-modify constraints to get the network fully secured 
against that type of attacks and reduce false alarms. Thus, our goal is to use these 
constraints to monitor the ongoing network traffic and generate alerts in case of 
violation.   
 
Like I mentioned before, 11 constraints have previously been identified by the research 
group so far: 
1. IGMP – Frequency of Join Report: A host is only allowed to send two 
successive Join Reports to a specific group. 
2. IGMP – Frequency of Membership Report: Between two queries, a host can 
send its Membership Report only once to its specific group address. 
3. IGMP – Destination of Membership Report: After receiving a General Query, a 
host will eventually send its Membership Report. 
4. IGMP – Validity of Membership Report: After leaving a group, a host will not 
send any Membership Report to any multicast group unless it joins again. 
5. RTPS – Validity of participants: All the Publishers and Subscribers in DDS 
must be a valid member of an IGMP multicast group. These participants should 
have sent a Membership Report before showing their interest in a Topic. 
6. RTPS – Arrival of Participants: After joining a multicast group, participation 
should be announced from that host within a constant period of time. 
7. RTPS – Participant’s dual role: A participant cannot be Publisher and Subscriber 
of the same Topic at the same time. 
8. RTPS – Subscriber turning Publisher: A Topic Key can only be published from 
a specific set of hosts. 
9. RTPS – Publishing frequency: In synchronous mode, a Publisher has to publish 
in a fixed frequency rate. 
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10. RTPS – Quality of Service: The QoS policy between a Publisher and a 
Subscriber cannot be altered during run-time of the application. 
11. RTPS – Validity of communication: Only a valid Publisher and a valid 
Subscriber can communicate. 
 
Although we had firstly defined three as the number of constraints that I should 
develop, I have finally contributed to the project by coming up with a new approach to 
represent and evaluate five out of those eleven constraints. Its purpose was to compare 
the results of evaluating sample RTPS and IGMP traffic data against these five 
constraints with my approach to my partner Siam Hassan’s approach. These constraints 
are the following: 
 
C1. IGMP – Frequency of Join Report: A host is only allowed to send two 
successive Join Reports to a specific group. 
According to the IGMP manual, a host can send a Membership Report to the router 
whenever it wants to join a multicast group without previously having received a 
Membership Query. We will call this particular type of Membership Report “Join 
Report”. Additionally, the host can send another Join Report to the same router covering 
the possibility of the previous message being lost or damaged. The host can do that 
several times within a short period of time. Consequently, this will result in a DDoS 
attack [43], causing other hosts become unresponsive if we do not stop it.  
So here is the foundation of our first constraint. Limiting a host to send two successive 
Join Reports to a router avoids the possibility of denying the service to other legitimate 
users in the multicast group and saturating the network. 
 
C5. RTPS – Validity of participants: All the Publishers and Subscribers in DDS must 
be a valid member of an IGMP multicast group. These participants should have sent a 
Membership Report before showing their interest in a Topic. 
An illegitimate host can secretly listen to a conversation by becoming a Reader of a 
certain Topic and gain access to unauthorized data. Analogously, a host can interfere 
and push malicious data into the network by becoming an illegitimate Publisher on a 
Topic. 
Constraint 5 makes sure that all the Publishers and Subscribers of the private network 
are authorized. Thereby, considering that DDS depends on multicast groups, every host 
should be a valid multicast member and become a Participant of a Topic before it can 
read or write data related to that Topic. 
 
C7. RTPS – Participant’s dual role: A participant cannot be Publisher and Subscriber 
of the same Topic at the same time. 
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As we already know, a Topic is the link that connects Publishers and Subscribers. 
Referring to the DDS manual, it is perfectly possible that a Participant can become a 
Publisher and a Subscriber of the same Topic at the same time. Hence, a Participant can 
listen to data on a certain Domain, alter this data and, eventually, forward it to the 
multicast group. This fact can lead to two possible attacks: a malicious Publisher 
sending illegitimate data; or a denial of service caused by increasing the network’s 
traffic. 
Accordingly, Constraint 7 prevents these scenarios by making sure that a current 
Publisher of a certain Topic in a Domain does not become a Subscriber of the same 
Topic in that Domain, and vice versa.  
 
C8. RTPS – Subscriber turning Publisher: A Topic Key can only be published from a 
specific set of hosts. 
RTPS is used in Air Traffic Control (ATC) [44] worldwide to provide securer air traffic 
management and communications. For instance, there must be just a specific set of 
radar information publishers, or a specific machine which allows a plane to land. In 
ATC, this means very sensible information that must be carefully taken care of to 
provide a safe and efficient movement of aircrafts in the airspace. 
Constraint 8 refers to defining a set of Publishers responsible for sending a restricted 
type of information. Therefore, any machine publishing restricted information that does 
not belong to the set of allowed Publishers for that Topic constitutes an intrusion. 
 
C11. RTPS – Validity of communication: Only a valid Publisher and a valid 
Subscriber can communicate. 
During an RTPS unicast communication, DATA packets are constantly being sent from 
Publishers to Subscribers. In our previous constraints we were checking that either the 
Participants were members of a valid multicast group or that Publishers were legitimate. 
Now, we are taking into consideration that when a Publisher sends a DATA packet, its 
destination is a valid Subscriber. 
For this type of constraints, it is not enough to check the validity of the Publisher, as an 
authorize host could be publishing “legitimate” information to intruders. Hence we must 
check that every DATA packet sent in our network is coming from a trustable Publisher 
and reaching an allowed Subscriber. 
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5. Implementation 
 
Once the packets are scanned and successfully parsed by the previous project’s modules 
(Figure 1), they are passed to the Constraint Engine. According to its protocol, it already 
receives the necessary parameters of each packet to deal with the constraints. Its basic 
function is to evaluate the data structures received by the Parser and prompt an alert 
when a constraint is violated. Figure 6 shows a simplified framework of constraint 
based IDS. 
 
 
Fig. 6. IDS Framework. 
 
As the project is coded in C and, unlike C++, there was not any tree or Directed Acyclic 
Graph (DAG) [45] structure available to use, my first approach was to develop our own 
tree class and tree structure myself, as well as all its functionality. Moreover, the trees 
were not always binary trees [46], and the number of children of each node could vary 
depending on the constraint, making it more difficult to represent our data. Every time a 
packet arrived, I had to loop through the tree to populate the leaf nodes, as well as to 
evaluate it (Figure 7 shows how the constraint trees look like). Hence, this approach 
resulted to be O(log n) and, therefore, considerably costly in time [47]. 
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Fig. 7. Constraint’s tree skeleton. 
 
As a result, I had to develop a better approach.  This approach is still using trees to 
represent and solve the constraints. However, instead of creating a tree class, I have 
coded a new DAG structure (Figure 8), which represents a constraint as an array of 
nodes by just keeping a pointer to the Root Node and the length of the structure. With 
this structure I can uniquely represent a general skeleton for each single constraint. 
Also, every time I need to create a new instance for the tree I just have to allocate some 
memory and do a memcopy() [48], without having to walk through the tree to copy it.  
 
 
Fig. 8. Snippet of the DAG structure. 
 
Consequently, I have also developed a node structure (Figure 9) to be able to represent 
the differences between the operator and the leaf nodes. These differences refer to their 
values and number of children. Each node is composed by a value, an integer that 
indicates the position where its children start to be allocated in the array, an integer 
referring to its number of children and a type of node. Knowing the position and 
number of children allows us to build the hierarchy of the tree.  The “eType” field 
indicates whether the node is an Operator Node or a Leaf node. Depending on the Leaf 
Node’s type (integer or char) its “vValue” field may vary. Finally, I distinguish between 
the various types of Operator Nodes: “andOp”, “orOp”, “eqOp” and “notEqOp” 
correspond to their logical expressions “&&”, “||”, “==” and “!=”. Whereas the “viol” 
and “aff” operators only refer to Root Nodes. The “viol” operator means that that tree 
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should prompt an alert if its evaluation is not satisfied, while the “aff” operator means 
that an alert should be prompt if the tree’s evaluation is satisfied. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Snippet of the Node structure. 
 
Due to this structure, I am able to know the exact position of every node in the array for 
each constraint, making every operation made on a node O(1), accessing directly to the 
position without having to loop through the tree. This will be easier to understand if we 
take a look to Figure 10 (Constraint 1 tree). Thereby, the four constraints’ trees I have 
developed and their corresponding snippets of code using this tree structure are as 
follow: 
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Fig. 10. Tree drawing of Constraint 1. 
 
 
Fig. 11. DAG structure for Constraint 1. 
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Fig. 12. Tree drawing of Constraint 5. 
 
 
Fig. 13. DAG structure for Constraint 5. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Tree drawing of Constraint 7. 
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Fig. 15. DAG structure for Constraint 7. 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. Tree drawing of Constraint 8. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. DAG structure for Constraint 8. 
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Fig. 18. Tree drawing of Constraint 11. 
 
 
Fig. 19. DAG structure for Constraint 11. 
 
Additionally, I have created a Hash Table [49] structure for each type of constraint to 
keep track of the existing trees alive. Every Hash Table is formed by a key and a value. 
In my approach, I have created a “hashnode” structure where the key for each Hash 
Table is composed of the parameters that create that constraint and identify a single 
instance of the constraint, and the value is a pointer to the position where the Tree Root 
for that constraint is allocated. As a result, my Hash Table is an array of “hashnodes”. 
Thereby, this Hash Table allows me to easily find out whether a tree exists or not and, if 
it already exists, modify or delete it. Figure 20 shows how this structure looks like for 
Constraint 1. Similarly, it works for the other three constraints. 
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Fig.20. Snippet of the Hash Table structure for Constraint 1. 
 
Thanks to my partner’s previous research, we have come up with a four-phase-
procedure to solve the constraints. Thereby, when a new packet arrives and matches any 
of our constraints, it is classified to its corresponding phase. These four phases are 
Instantiate, Bind, Evaluate and Delete.  
1. Instantiate: every constraint has an action that triggers the creation of a new 
tree and, consequently, makes us take into consideration different aspects of the 
machine causing it and follow up its behavior. This action is often related to a 
specific type of message. Thus, the Instantiate phase refers to the creation of a 
new tree skeleton and population of the first leaf nodes with the corresponding 
values of a packet that is sending a “trigger message” that matches any of our 
constraints. Besides, it is understood that such tree should not previously exist. 
 
2. Bind: there are single packet constraints (already managed by the Parser) and 
multiple packet constraints. Within multiple packet constraints we can 
distinguish between two-packet constraints and more-than-two-packet 
constraints. The reason why we make this distinction is because of the Bind 
phase. This phase takes place when the arriving message corresponds to an 
expected message to fill in the remaining leaves from a previously created tree 
in the Instantiate phase. However, the constraint’s tree is not ready to be 
evaluated yet, because is still waiting for more packets. Hence, exclusively 
more-than-two-packet constraints contain this Bind phase. On the contrary, two-
packet constraints would go directly for evaluation when one of those messages 
arrives. 
In addition, usually just taking a look at the drawing trees it is easy to know if 
that constraint has a Bind phase or not. So, if the number of children of the last 
level Operator Nodes is greater than two, it means that the tree has a Bind phase. 
Although sometimes it might need the Bind phase even if it the number is two. 
 
3. Evaluate: similarly to the Bind phase, when an expected packet matching an 
Instantiation tree arrives, its remaining leaves are populated. The difference with 
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the Bind phase is that the constraint does not have to wait for more packets to be 
evaluated. As a result, when this phase takes place, the tree is ready for 
evaluation. Furthermore, it will prompt an alert if the evaluation results to be a 
violation of the constraint. 
 
4. Delete: although we might think that every tree is being deleted after its 
evaluation, this assumption is not always valid. It could be possible that a tree is 
deleted right after being evaluated, but that does not usually happen. Normally, 
the trees are kept alive until a specific message or action says the contrary (this 
concept will better be understood when we will go through each single 
constraint’s case). When that happens, we will both free the memory of the tree 
itself and its reference in the Hash Map.  
 
According to this four-phase procedure, the five constraints I have been working on 
were developed as described below: 
 
5.1. CONSTRAINT 1: A host is only allowed to send two successive Join Reports to a 
specific group. 
Just a reminder that a Join Report refers to a Membership Report sent by a host without 
previously having received a Membership Query from the router. This constraint was 
caused by the fact that a host might want to join a multicast group without have been 
queried by the router responsible for that group. 
Instantiate: this phase takes place when a host sends an IGMPv2 or IGMPv3 Report to 
a multicast group address and such address does not match to a previous Membership 
Query made from that address. Resultantly, if it did not exist yet in the Constraint 1 
Hash Table (which would mean that the Join Report is not the first one sent by that host 
and its tree has already been instantiated), we create a new Constraint 1 tree and we 
populate its first leaf nodes. Besides, we insert it in the correspondent Hash Table. 
Figure 21 represents the part of the code corresponding to Constraint 1’s instantiation 
and Figure 22 shows how the tree would look like at the end of this phase. 
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Fig. 21: Snippet of code of Instantiate phase for Constraint 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 22: Tree drawing after Instantiate phase for Constraint 1. 
 
Bind: similarly to the Instantiate phase, it takes place when a host sends an IGMPv2 or 
IGMPv3 Report to a multicast group. However, this time it already exists a tree created 
due to a previous Join Report from that host to that router. Hence, we do not have to 
Instantiate a new tree, but simply insert the values of the respective Leaf Nodes of the 
tree that already exists. Figure 23 represents a snippet of the Bind phase for Constraint 1 
and Figure 24 shows the actual state of its tree. 
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Fig. 23: Snippet of code of Bind phase for Constraint 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 24: Tree drawing after Bind phase for Constraint 1. 
 
Evaluate: once again, the trigger action refers to when a host sends an IGMPv2 or 
IGMPv3 Report to a multicast group. But this time, the tree has already been 
instantiated and bound. As a consequence we fill in the last values of the Leaf Nodes as 
shown in Figure 25, and we send the tree for evaluation. The reason why we evaluate an 
identical copy of our tree is because our evaluate() function modifies the tree’s values. 
This action will prompt an error if there is a failure in the evaluation function. Figure 26 
represents the snippet of code for this phase of Constraint 1. 
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Fig. 25: Snippet of code of Evaluate phase for Constraint 1. 
 
 
Fig. 26: Tree drawing after Evaluate phase for Constraint 1. 
 
Delete: At this point we remove the tree from its Hash Table as well as the reference to 
its memory position. This action is caused by the arrival of a Membership Query from 
the router to the host which corresponded to Constraint 1 tree’s keys. In other words, if 
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a host that has previously sent a Join Report to a router receives a Membership Query 
from the same router, we will delete the tree. Figure 27 represents the snippet of code 
corresponding to Constraint 1’s deletion phase. 
 
 
Fig. 27: Snippet of code of Delete phase for Constraint 1. 
 
5.2. CONSTRAINT 5: All the Publishers and Subscribers in DDS must be a valid 
member of an IGMP multicast group. These participants should have sent a 
Membership Report before showing their interest in a Topic. 
The inception of Constraint 5 is to avoid illegitimate hosts participating in a DDS 
communication. Equally to Constraint 1, as it involves more than to packets to 
determine if there is any violation of this constraint, we will again have the four phases. 
Instantiate: if a host sends a Membership Report to a multicast group address from 
which had previously received a Membership Query, this will lead us to create a new 
tree for Constraint 5 and, consequently insert it in the correspondent Hash Table. Figure 
28 shows how the tree looks like after being instantiated. Actually, the type of message 
that triggers the Instantiate phase for Constraint 5 (Membership Report) is the same that 
the one that caused the Instantiate, Bind and Evaluate phases for Constraint 1, as we can 
appreciate in Figure 29. 
 
 
 
Fig. 28: Tree drawing after Instantiate phase for Constraint 5. 
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Fig. 29: Snippet of code of handling an IGMPv2 Report. 
 
Bind: before a host can write or read data related to a certain topic within a Domain, it 
must foster the Domain Participant’s QoS specifications [13]. This assures that all Data 
Writers, Data Readers, Publishers and Subscribers share the same QoS parameters in 
the corresponding Domain. Thereby, the Bind phase takes place when a host that 
matches to a previous Instantiation tree for Constraint 5 sends a message to become a 
member of the Domain Participant. Figure 30 represents the state of Constraint 5’s tree 
after the Bind phase. 
 
 
Fig. 30: Tree drawing after Bind phase for Constraint 5. 
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Evaluate: Constraint 5 is evaluated every time a Data(w) or a Data(r) are sent, checking 
that either the Publisher or the Subscriber for that Topic has previously joined the IGMP 
group and the Domain Participant. Thus, it is important to notice that we might have to 
go through the Evaluate phase for Constraint 5 without having done the corresponding 
Instantiate or Bind phases before. In that case, we would first check if there already 
exists its respective Instantiation tree for Constraint 5, prompting a violation of the 
constraint if it did not exist. Figure 31 shows how the Constraint 5’s tree looks like after 
evaluation in the case of having gone through the previous instantiation and bound. 
 
 
 
Fig. 31: Tree drawing after Evaluate phase for Constraint 5. 
 
Delete: the trigger action for the Constraint 5’s tree deletion is a Leave Report message 
from the appropriate host to the correspondent multicast group. So, this means that the 
host does not want to belong to that IGMP group anymore and we have to remove it 
from its respective Constraint 5’s Hash Table. 
 
5.3. CONSTRAINT 7: A participant cannot be Publisher and Subscriber of the same 
Topic at the same time. 
Constraint 7 just involves two packets: a Publisher packet and a Subscriber packet. 
Therefore, we do not have a Bind phase this time. However, we need to differentiate 
between two possible situations: if a Publisher comes first and instantiates the tree, so 
the following Subscriber will be the evaluation packet (C7a); or, on the contrary, a 
Subscriber arrives first and the Publisher is the one evaluates the tree (C7b). 
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Instantiate: we instantiate a C7a’s tree every time a Data(w) packet (which corresponds 
to a Publisher) arrives and it does not match to a corresponding instantiation tree created 
by the same host sending a Subscriber packet. Analogously, we instantiate a C7b’s tree 
every time a Data(r) packet (which corresponds to a Subscriber) arrives and it does not 
match to any previously instantiated tree created by the same host sending a Publisher 
packet. In any case, we have to insert them in their respective Hash Table. However, 
their drawing trees look exactly the same. Figure 32 shows how both C7a’s tree and 
C7b’s tree look like after instantiation. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 32: Tree drawing after Instantiate phase for Constraint 7. 
 
Evaluate: similarly to how we have instantiated the trees works the Evaluate phase. 
This is also triggered by a Publisher or a Subscriber packet. On the one hand, we 
evaluate C7a when a new Publisher packet arrives and it already exists its correspondent 
C7b’s instantiation tree. On the other hand, we will send C7b for evaluation if a 
Publisher packet arrives and matches to its correspondent C7a’s instantiation tree. 
Figure 33 illustrate the evaluation trees for both C7a and C7b. 
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Fig. 33: Tree drawing after Evaluate phase for Constraint 7. 
 
Delete: when a host sends a Leave Report and it matches to a previously created 
Constraint 7’s tree we will both delete the respective tree and its reference in the Hash 
Table. 
 
5.4. CONSTRAINT 8: A Topic Key can only be published from a specific set of hosts. 
For every Topic there is a list of legitimate Publishers, which are the only ones allowed 
to push data about that Topic. As a result, Constraint 8 just needs to check if a Data(w) 
message comes from one of those legitimate hosts. It might seem that this is a single 
packet constraint and, consequently, it should be evaluated by the Parser. However, here 
is where we introduce the concept of “Learning Mode” [52]. Every other constraint I 
have mentioned before is part of the “Checking Mode”, but our Constraint Engine also 
possesses a “Learning Mode” which has been developed by my partner. This “Learning 
Mode” allows our Constraint Engine to, as its own name implies, to learn from “facts” 
[52] and include them to our engine. Therefore, when we have a new Publisher packet 
we will include it to our “facts”, letting us know in the future that such host is a valid 
Publisher. Hence, our Constraint Engine is able to update itself and learn from those 
updates, dealing with constraints that, as happens with Constraint 8, might appear to be 
single packet constraints and, as a consequence, validated by the Parser. Thus, as it does 
not involve more than two packets to be evaluated, this constraint only has three out of 
our four phases. 
 
Instantiate: whenever we are in “Learning Mode” and we receive a message from a 
host wanting to become part of the Domain Participant, we will instantiate a new 
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Constraint 8’s tree. Like this, we will also insert it in its respective Hash Table. Figure 
34 represents Constraint 8’s tree after instantiation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 34: Tree drawing after Instantiate phase for Constraint 8. 
 
Evaluate: after having instantiated our tree for Constraint 8, the following incoming 
Publisher packets from that host in that Domain will be sent for evaluation, without 
going through a Bind phase. Also, notice that, as happened with Constraint 5, we might 
have to evaluate Constraint 8 without having previously instantiated its tree. In other 
words, we have to check if every Publisher is trustable, resulting this in a violation of 
Constraint 8 if that Publisher did not belong to a previous instantiated tree. Figure 35 
shows the state of Constraint 8’s tree after evaluation. 
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Fig. 35: Tree drawing after Evaluate phase for Constraint 8. 
 
Delete: as it happens with most of the constraints, the Delete phase takes place when 
that specific host sends a Leave Report to the multicast group. Consequently, we have 
to update our “facts” this time apart from removing the tree and its reference in the Hash 
Table. 
 
5.5. CONSTRAINT 11: Only a valid Publisher and a valid Subscriber can communicate. 
Instantiate: the packet that triggers the instantiation of Constraint 11 is a Data(w) 
packet sent by a host that is notifying the router that wants to become a new Publisher. 
As a consequence, when this type of packet arrives we will store in the tree the packet’s 
respective IP and entity key to, later on, insert it in the correspondent Hash Table. This 
will mean that the host is a validated Publisher. Also, the search keys to find that tree in 
the Hash Table will be the Topic Key and the Publisher IP, so those are the values we 
will have to look for in the Bind phase. Figure 36 shows the state of the Constraint 11 
tree after being instantiated. 
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Fig. 36: Tree drawing after Instantiate phase for Constraint 11. 
 
Bind: the Bind phase takes place when a Data(r) packet from a Subscriber arrives. As 
mentioned before we will have to look for the Topic Key and the Publisher IP that that 
Subscriber is willing to listen to. Depending on the result of that search we will have 
two different options: if we cannot find the tree it would be an error, or if, on the 
contrary it does, we would have to go for an intermediate phase called “Split” [52]. This 
consists on making an exact copy of the instantiation tree, populate the new values and 
update the new search keys, because the evaluation packet for Constraint 11 will be 
looking for the Publisher IP, Publisher port and Subscriber IP instead of the Topic Key 
and Publisher IP. Consequently, we will also delete the previous instantiation tree. 
Figure 37 helps visualizing the state of the tree after this phase. 
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Fig. 37: Tree drawing after Bind phase for Constraint 11. 
 
Evaluate: when a DATA packet is sent from a Publisher to a Subscriber Constraint 11 
will go for evaluation. Thus, we will search for the Bind phase’s keys and store the 
remaining Leaf nodes. If after finishing populating the tree all its nodes are validated, 
we can assure that the DATA was communicated from a legitimate Publisher to an 
authorized Subscriber. We can visually see represented the Constraint 11 tree after the 
evaluation phase takes place in Figure 38. 
 
 
 
Fig. 38: Tree drawing after Evaluate phase for Constraint 11. 
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Delete: the corresponding tree for Constraint 11 will be destroyed when any of the 
respective participants leave the multicast group. Resultantly, that tree will also be 
removed from the Hash Table. 
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6. Evaluation 
 
Assuming that all the trees corresponding to a same constraint look alike could mean 
that keeping the full tree structure is no longer needed. In other words, if we know that, 
for example, the third node of the Constraint 7’s tree is always an “EQUAL” node, why 
do we have to loop through it and check that node’s value every time we evaluate 
Constraint 7? Besides, why do we have to keep all the Operator Nodes for every 
instance of a constraint’s tree if we already know what their values are always going to 
be? It should only be necessary to save the leaves’ values to evaluate the constraint. 
In fact, that is Siam’s approach: to assume that the Operator Nodes for a certain 
constraint never change, so we do not have to keep them and save memory for them 
every time we create a new tree for that constraint. In addition, he is evaluating the trees 
by simply comparing the leaf values with the operators that “we assume do not vary”, 
without looping through all the tree structure. However, we are not completely sure 
about that assumption. 
Thus, the purpose of this research is to compare the results of my evaluation to Siam’s, 
testing our Constraint Engine against sample generated traffic data. As a result, if the 
assumption that we are making is eventually true, we could test whether getting rid of 
the Operator Nodes and avoid walking through the trees is time costly significant. 
Therefore, focusing in my approach, it consists on keeping a copy of the full tree 
structure every time we create a new instance of that tree and walking through every 
node of the tree when it is sent for evaluation without obviating whether the Operator 
nodes are always the same. So, in order to evaluate the trees using my approach I 
created a structure that behaves similarly to a stack, shown in Figure 39. Its basic 
functioning consists in pushing the Operator nodes to the stack until we find an 
Operator node whose children are Leaf nodes. In that case, we will evaluate its children 
and update the Operator node’s value with that result. Following, we will start going 
backwards in the stack evaluating the Operator nodes of the higher levels with the 
results obtained in the previous lower levels of the tree. 
 
 
Fig. 39: Snippet of the auxiliary stack structure. 
 
In order to make the evaluation function easier, I have developed three auxiliary 
functions, which we can appreciate in Figures 40, 41 and 42. The first of them simply 
checks whether a certain node’s children are Leaf nodes. Thanks to that function, I can 
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easily identify which nodes belong to the last Operator nodes level and stop pushing the 
following nodes to the stack. Secondly, the CompareValues() function receives two 
nodes and an logic operator as parameters, and returns the result of evaluating those two 
node’s values against that parameter. This function results quite helpful to simplify the 
comparison between the Leaf nodes differentiating between the several types of logic 
operators. Finally, the getResults() method uses the previous function to gather the 
result of comparing the values of all of a certain node’s children according to that 
node’s operator, so I can compare more than two Leaf nodes and obtain a single result 
that will be used by the higher level Operator nodes to continue evaluating the tree. 
 
 
Fig. 40: Snippet of the auxiliary function HasLeafNode(). 
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Fig. 41: Snippet of the auxiliary function CompareValues(). 
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Fig. 42: Snippet of the auxiliary function getResults(). 
 
As a consequence, the actual evaluate() function takes advantage of the previously 
described auxiliary functions and returns the final evaluation result of a given tree. The 
way it works is the following: it starts pushing the Root node of the tree to the stack, 
and checks whether the Root’s children are Leaf nodes. If they are not Leaf nodes, it 
pushes them to the stack. Then, I similarly do the same with the following Operator 
nodes until there is an Operator node whose children are Leaf nodes. In that case, it will 
stop pushing more nodes to the stack. Thus, I end up just having all the Operator nodes 
in the stack. What the algorithm does at this point is comparing the values of the leaves 
of that last Operator node according to the node’s logic operator and updating the value 
of that node with the result of the comparison. Therefore, that Operator node’s value 
will no longer be a logic operator, but a 1 or a 0 instead, depending on the result. 
Analogously, it does the same with the rest of the Operator nodes, walking the stack 
backwards and passing the results of each comparison to the higher nodes levels of the 
tree. Once it gets to the front of the stack and, consequently, the Root of the tree, it 
generates the result of the function depending on regarding if the Root is a “viol” or an 
“aff” operator. 
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Fig. 43: Snippet of the evaluate() function. 
 
Resultantly, whenever a packet received on the PCAP file correctly parsed by the Parser 
is performing an action that causes that packet to be sent for evaluation against any of 
our constraints, it will call the previously mentioned evaluate() function and, 
consequently prompt an alert if it fails to be evaluated properly (if the function returns a 
0). 
In order to gather all the sample IGMP and RTPS traffic to evaluate my approach, our 
research group has used the Euroscope Simulator and ATC Display [50], which were 
also adapted from the Canadian Automated Air Traffic System (CAATS) [51] to use the 
RTPS protocol to communicate between the air traffic control centers, devices and 
controllers. Thanks to Euroscope, we are able to get virtual RTPS data generated by 
pilots flying for virtual airlines using flight simulators and air traffic controllers. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
7.1. Results and Conclusions 
The purpose of this research project was to come up with and test a new tree-
based approach for solving constraints in an Intrusion Detection System. 
Although my goal was to develop and test three out of our eleven IGMP and 
RTPS constraints, I have finally done five, so we could test the complete 
performance of my engine’s approach. Adding Constraints 8 and 11 to the first 
required three constraints made possible to successfully test my tree structures 
through all of our four evaluation phases, including the “Split” condition later 
introduced by my partner, and the learning from “Facts”. 
As a result, after running my Constraint Engine against a 1.6GB PCAP file for 
ten times we obtained an average of the following results: 16.112 s of time, with 
a 102.525 MB/s of throughput and 828.203 Mb/s bandwidth. Just remarking 
that a bandwidth of at least 180 Mb/s was already acceptable, so my engine was 
running almost 5 times faster. Thus, my approach turned to be just slightly 
slower than the non-tree-structure-based approach, with around 1.5s difference 
in time and around 300Mb/s less of bandwidth, which allows us to conclude that 
dealing with my tree structures does not significantly reduce the program’s 
performance. 
We have also demonstrated that our system is capable of dealing with multiple-
packet constraints using UDP and keeping the information of the packets, apart 
from successfully perform a deep packet inspection of them. 
The following table shows the average results of running my Constraint Engine 
against the 1.6GB PCAP file for ten times. 
 
Packets Parsed 10.707.581 
Packets Failed 113.435 
Total Packets 10.821.016 
Failure Rate 1,05 % 
C1 Evaluated 0 
C5 Evaluated 12 
C7a Evaluated 36 
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C7b Evaluated 0 
C8 Evaluated 66 
C11 Evaluate 3193212 
Time 16,112 s 
Throughput 102,525 MB/s 
Bandwidth 828,203 Mb/s 
 
Table 1. Results after running a 1.6 GB PCAP file for ten times. 
 
 
7.2. Future Work 
Our future work firstly consists in automatically generate all the C 
implementations for the constraints using our research’s group grammar in order 
to, in the future, provide a custom IDS for any private network with the 
possibility of easily adding new protocols to it. Also, new constraints should be 
found out and developed.  
Furthermore, just as Bro is nowadays for the research community, our future-
open-source IDS could be handful for private organizations willing to introduce 
their own protocols in the system, as well as widely-used tool for any network 
security and intrusion detection research. 
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8. Conclusiones y Trabajo Futuro 
 
8.1. Resultados y Conclusiones 
El propósito de este proyecto de investigación consistía en idear y probar un 
nuevo enfoque basado en árboles para la evaluación de restricciones en un 
Sistema de Detección de Intrusiones. Aunque en un principio my objetivo era 
desarrollar y probar tres de nuestras once restricciones IGMP y RTPS, 
finalmente he desarrollado cinco, mediante las cuales podíamos probar el 
correcto funcionamiento de mi enfoque del motor de restricciones. La 
implementación de las Restricciones 8 y 11, además de las tres requeridas 
anteriormente, hizo posible probar con éxito mis estructuras de árboles a través 
de las cuatro fases de evaluación, incluyendo la condición de “Split” que 
introdujo posteriormente mi compañero, y el aprendizaje de “Facts”. 
Como resultado, después de correr mi Motor de Restricciones diez veces ante un 
archivo PCAP de 1.6GB, hemos obtenido una media de los siguientes 
resultados: 16.112 s de tiempo, con un rendimiento de 102.525 MB/s y un 
ancho de banda de 828.203 Mb/s. Sólo remarcar que un ancho de banda de por 
lo menos 180 Mb/s ya se consideraba aceptable, por lo que mi motor va 5 veces 
más rápido. Así, mi aproximación resultó ser solo ligeramente más lenta que la 
aproximación sin usar estructuras de árboles de mi compañero, con una 
diferencia de alrededor de 1.5s en tiempo de ejecución y 300 MB/s menos de 
ancho de banda, lo que nos permite concluir que trabajar con las estructuras de 
árboles no reduce el rendimiento del programa de forma significativa. 
Con este proyecto también hemos demostrado que nuestro sistema es capaz de 
trabajar con restricciones multi-paquete usando UDP y guardando la 
información de los paquetes, aparte de realizar un inspección de paquetes 
profunda sobre ellos. 
La siguiente tabla muestra la media de los resultados obtenidos tras ejecutar  
diez veces el archivo PCAP de 1.6GB sobre mi Motor de Restricciones. 
 
Paquetes Parseados 10.707.581 
Paquetes Fallidos 113.435 
Paquetes Totales 10.821.016 
Tasa de Fallo 1,05 % 
C1 Evaluada 0 
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C5 Evaluada 12 
C7a Evaluada 36 
C7b Evaluada 0 
C8 Evaluada 66 
C11 Evaluada 3193212 
Tiempo 16,112 s 
Rendimiento 102,525 MB/s 
Ancho de Banda 828,203 Mb/s 
 
Tabla 1. Resultados después de correr el archivo PCAP de 1.6 GB diez veces. 
 
 
8.2. Trabajo Futuro 
Nuestro trabajo futuro consiste primeramente en generar automáticamente todo 
el código C correspondiente a la evaluación de las restricciones, usando la 
gramática desarrollada por nuestro grupo de investigación para, en el futuro, 
proveer un IDS personalizable para cualquier red privada con la posibilidad de 
añadir fácilmente cualquier protocolo a dicha red. Además, nuevas restricciones 
deberían ser encontradas y desarrolladas. 
Aún más, de la misma manera que Bro es hoy en día para la comunidad de 
investigación, nuestro futuro IDS open-source podría ser muy útil para 
organizaciones privadas que deseen introducir sus propios protocolos al sistema, 
así como una herramienta usada internacionalmente para cualquier investigación 
acerca de seguridad en redes y detección de intrusiones.   
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9. Appendix 
 
9.1. User Manual 
 
IMPORTANT: a Linux operative system is needed to run the program. 
 
 
9.1.1. Learning Mode 
 
Go to the IDS/parserGenerator/F_Constraints folder and open the 
Constraints.c file with a text editor. Comment out (or make sure that it is 
commented out) the “#define LEARN” line. Save the file. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 44: Snippet of code for Learning Mode. 
 
 
Open a new terminal and move to the IDS/parserGenerator/F_Constraints 
directory. Compile and link the program using make. It is possible than 
make has nothing to be done at all. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 45: Using make command. 
 
 
Run the program using the following command: 
./pcapparse LongStressTest.pcapng 
 
Once you have run it, the program will have “learned” from our Facts 
files and will be ready for execution. It is possible that some of the 
constraints that do not need to learn from facts for their evaluation were 
evaluated. You should get something like this: 
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Fig. 46: Running the program in Learning Mode. 
 
 
 
 
9.1.2. Checking Mode 
 
Go to the IDS/parserGenerator/F_Constraints folder and open the 
Constraints.c file with a text editor. Comment (or make sure that it is 
commented) the “#define LEARN” line. Save the file. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 47: Snippet of code for Checking Mode. 
 
 
Open a new terminal and move to the IDS/parserGenerator/F_Constraints 
directory. Compile and link the program using make. It is possible than 
make has nothing to be done at all. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 45: Using make command. 
 
 
Run the program using one of the two following options: 
 
1. ./pcapparse LongStressTest.pcapng. This option is thought for 
performance testing, so we do not specify any trace file where to write 
the outputs. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 48: Running command for 2 arguments. 
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2. ./pcapparse LongStressTest.pcapng parsertrace [traceFileName]. 
This option, apart from showing the results of the execution in the 
terminal, it also writes the outputs to a trace file. Once the program 
has finished running, you can check the outputs opening the traceFile 
file which has been created in the same directory. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 49: Running command for 4 arguments. 
 
 
In any case, you should get the same results printed out in the terminal, 
which should be similar to these: 
 
 
 
Fig. 50: Running the program in Checking Mode. 
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